The governance structure of the Lebanese Republic is particularly characterized by its confessional nature guaranteeing a pre-defined representation of Christians and Muslims and its sectarian subgroups in parliament. In this sense, the composition of the parliament is based on the allocation of a specific number of seats to each of the two major religious groups and its sectarian subgroups. However, the ratio being used to assign seats to these sectarian subgroups is still intensively discussed. Recently, Diss and Zouache (2015) have addressed some aspects of power in the Lebanese Parliament. Applying the Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices, they investigate the relative confessional power distributions under the current seat distribution and a proposal for its amendment and revealed some paradoxical effects. In this paper, we re-examine their results applying the Penrose-Banzhaf measure. Furthermore, we extend their analysis by including the seat distribution from the previous constitution into our analysis and relate our findings to the motivations for the electoral reforms underlying the three studied seat distributions. Additionally, we address the implications of the existing party blocs in the current parliament from a party and confessional perspective. Currently, their existence is put into question in the public and political discussion. With our analysis, we deliver a theoretical foundation for this debate and demonstrate that in terms of parliamentary power the current bloc formation is a priori disadvantageous.
Introduction
Many political analysts consider the Lebanese Republic to be one of the most democratic nations in the Arab world. The governance structure of the Lebanese Republic is particularly characterized by the long history of the confessional nature of its constitution. Confessions play an important role and are a determining factor of the composition of Lebanese Parliament. The constitution guarantees a pre-defined representation of Christians and Muslims and its sectarian subgroups in parliament, composed by a unique legislative chamber. 1 In this sense, the composition of the parliament is based on the allocation of a specific number of seats to each of the two major religious groups and its 18 recognized sectarian subgroups: there exist 12 different Christian and 6 different Muslim sectarian subgroups representing about 99% of the population. 2 By its nature, the ratio being used to assign seats to these sectarian subgroups and the total size of the parliament have been, and still are subject of intensive discussions by Lebanese political parties and political scientists.
In all parliamentary elections held between independence in 1945 until 1972, seats were apportioned between Christians and Muslims in a 6:5 ratio in favor of the Christians. Moreover, further ratios inside the Christian and Muslim sectarian subgroups were applied -all being roughly proportional to respective shares in the population. This dominance of the Christians and, in particular, its largest sectarian subgroup, namely the Maronite, 3 played a prominent role in the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. Finally, after almost 15 years of civil war, and further demographic changes and migrations, the Taif agreement 4 from 1989 put an end to the armed conflicts in 1990 and introduced the current confessional structure. The Taif agreement maintains the spirit of the previous confessional governance structure, but 're-equilibrated' the relationship between Muslims and Christians by now introducing a fifty-fifty ratio for the allocation of parliamentary seats. Today, the distribution of parliamentary seats provided by the Taif agreement is formally still in place, but the last elections were only conducted in 2009. Since then, several attempts to find a consensual electoral law have failed. Nowadays, the most discussed proposal is the so-called Orthodox Proposal.
The main criticism of Lebanon's previous distributions of parliamentary seats, as well as the new proposal, is that they are not representative. Indeed, the efforts are complicated by the fact that parliamentary seats have to be allocated such that both major religious groups (as well as its sectarian subgroups) are on equal footing. The tacit assumption behind this suggestion is a strong (if not total) positive linear correlation of the share of seats in parliament and the share of power attached to them. However, as it is wellknown from the theory of voting power, this tacit assumption does, in general, not hold. 5 By this paper we provide a threefold extension of their analysis. Firstly, we are going to include the Pre-Taif composition of the parliament into our analysis. Secondly, our study will make use of the Penrose-Banzhaf measure (Dubey and Shapley, 1979) . In addition to the indices employed by Diss and Zouache (2015) this allows not only to study the relative power distribution inside the parliament under each of the three compositions, but also to analyze the total changes in power between Muslims and Christians and its sectarian subgroups when moving from one composition to another. This produces insights which, in general, will be helpful to assess the effects of past and future reforms of the Lebanese electoral law and, in particular, will be useful to shed light on the implications of an implementation of the Orthodox Proposal. We demonstrate that, even under our nonnormalized approach, some of the paradoxical results found by Diss and Zouache (2015) remain to exist. Thirdly, we study the distribution of party power in parliament. The current political situation in parliament is characterized by the existence of two large blocs, 'March 8' and 'March 14', containing members from different parties and sectarian subgroups across the major religious groups. However, currently, in Lebanese politics and in the public discussion, despite its formal existence, the practical existence and usefulness of these blocs are put into question. We analyze the implications of the existence of both blocs and their stability conditions from the party and confessional perspective to provide a scientific foundation for the current public and political discussion. Applying an approach suggested by Machover (2002a,b, 2008) our analysis demonstrates that at least the current bloc formation is a priori disadvantageous from a party as well as from a confessional perspective, i.e., in terms of power for some parties and some confessions, being member of the blocs, it would be beneficial if the blocs would cease to exist.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of the confessional governance structure in Lebanon which merely concerns the main aspects required for the present paper. In Section 3 we provide a brief description of the framework for the measurement of (voting) power which we apply for analysis. In Section 4 we present our results and in Section 5 we wrap up the paper with some concluding remarks.
The Confessional Governance Structure of Lebanese Republic
The origins of the confessional governance structure in Lebanon can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire , where it was first recognized that the presence of many different confessions in the same small territory necessitated certain mediatory measures. During the French mandate period a further development of the confessional structure took place. Since the independence in 1943, many reforms have been proposed in order to foster the transition of the Lebanese governance structure towards a 'pure' democracy. However, despite the 1989 Taif Agreement's stipulation to eventually abolish the confessional structure, no reform has yet been passed in this direction and Lebanon still is well known for the confessional nature of its governance structure. As previously noticed in Section 1, representation in the Lebanese Parliament was set at a 6:5 ratio in favor of the Christians. This has been the basis for the distribution of parliamentary seats for many decades. The main reason for the 6:5 ratio can be traced back to the existence of a demographic dominance of Christians in the past. 6 The ratio was established according to demographic data from the national census of 1932, the last national census in Lebanon, which took still place under the French mandate. Due to the fact that the ratio was fixed in the constitution, parliamentary representation did not account for subsequent demographic changes, which resulted in a Muslim majority. During the 1960s, Muslims became largely dissatisfied with the existing constitution and as a result many reforms were conducted. However, the reforms carried out stayed well within the confessional 'power-balancing' framework with the same 6:5 ratio. The seat distribution called Pre-Taif in Table 1 represents seats allocation during the four successive elections  of 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 . During this period, the Maronites, the major sectarian subgroup of the Christians, had 30 seats which is the highest rate. Furthermore, the Alawites, a small Muslim minority, were even not recognized as a sectarian subgroup in the parliament.
In the 1970's, in particular due to demographic effects, the so-far existing population ratio between Christians and Muslims changed in the favor of Muslims. 7 As a consequence, the distribution of political power, which was based on the 1932 census, ceased to reflect demographic realities, and these developments augmented the Muslim demand for institutional reform. Most political scientists believe this was one of the main reasons for the Lebanese civil war. 8 The Taif Agreement, that put an end to the civil war, is not considered as the best arrangement for launching the process of rebuilding a more stable governance structure despite the fact that, by its terms, the power of the president was then reduced in favor of the prime minister and the speaker of the parliament. 9 More precisely, Lebanon preserved a confessional parliament but, under this agreement, the parliamentary seats were equally distributed between Christians and Muslims. At the same time the size of parliament increased from 99 to 128 seats. The distribution called 'Present' in Table 1 represents seats allocation for all elections held in Lebanon since 1992, the first parliamentary election under the Taif agreement. 
7 While during this period there was a strong emigration movements by Christians for many reasons, the Shia had the highest birth rate, followed by the Sunnis. 8 For more details about the Lebanese civil war, see, for instance, Makdisi and Sadaka (2003) and Haugbolle (2010) . 9 More precisely, with respect to the main public offices (see footnote 1), the Sunni prime minister and the ministerial cabinet took over some of previous responsibilities of the presidency for whom the 'power' diminished. Furthermore, the 'power' of the President of parliament, a Muslim Shia, was reinforced.
Since 2005 (see footnote 18) Lebanon has experienced a series of political crises. After the parliamentary elections in 2009, the next elections, formerly planned for 2013, were canceled and since then the parliament continued to extend its mandate. This decision was justified by the failure to reach a consensus over an electoral reform and under the pretext that the security situation did not favor holding elections. Currently, the mandate of the parliament is extended until June 2017 and several options are discussed, including a new sectarian distribution of parliamentary seats. 10 To achieve this objective, the parliament even created a national commission and gave it the task to restructure the prevalent electoral rules. As a result, many proposals have been discussed in recent years, but still, even according to the law the next elections are due to take place on 21 May 2017, no agreement has been reached. However, one of the most important and promising proposals is known as the Orthodox Proposal (submitted by a Greek Orthodox) which aims to recognize the increased share of Muslims in the population by strengthening the position of Muslims in parliament without deviating form the fifty-fifty ratio. The Orthodox Proposal (OP) aims to achieve this by a further increase of the size of parliament from 128 to 134 seats allocating 3 more seats to each religious group. More precisely, the proposal recommends to allocate one additional seat to each of the three largest Muslim sectarian subgroups (namely, Sunni, Shia and Druze). Furthermore, all 3 Christian seats should be allocated to the so-called 'Other Christian Groups' while the number of seats for all other sectarian subgroups should be kept at the same level. In this way the proposal aims to strengthen the relative position of the larger Muslim sectarian subgroups in parliament, while weakening the relative position of the major Christian sectarian subgroups. The resulting can be found in Table 1 denoted as the seat distribution 'OP'.
Finally, we have to address the decision-making procedures applied in the Lebanese parliament. The parliament makes use of two different (simultaneous) decision rules. The first decision rule is the simple majority rule used for ordinary legislation as well as the second and next rounds of the presidential election which takes place in the parliament. The second decision rule is the 2/3-majority rule adopted for constitutional changes and for the first round of the presidential election.
Measuring Power
In this section, we present a brief description of the framework for the measurement of (voting) power, required for the rest of this paper. The starting point is some arbitrary simple voting game (SVG) (Shapley, 1962) which is used to represent simultaneous binary decision-making rules as applied in the Lebanese parliament, i.e., if a decision has to be made in favor or against a suggested proposal. 11 An SVG denoted by W, is a collection of subsets W of a finite set N , satisfying: (i) N ∈ W, (ii) ∅ / ∈ W, and (iii) Monotonicity: whenever X ⊆ Y ⊆ N and X ∈ W then also Y ∈ W. W is called proper if, in addition, it satisfies: whenever X ∈ W and Y ∈ W then X ∩ Y = ∅. Otherwise, W is called improper. N , called the assembly, denotes the largest set in W. a ∈ N are the agents (in our case confessions or parties) of W. S, called a coalition, denotes a subset of N : S ⊆ N . It is called a winning coalition if S ∈ W, while if S ∈ L = P(N ) − W it is called a losing coalition. Moreover, note that there exist 2 n−1 ways in which agents in an proper SVG can be partitioned into two complementary coalitions such that either one belonging to W and one to L, or both to L. Hence, S can be seen as an 'index' for those agents who join the same view on a proposal. At the same time 2 n−1 is also the number of coalitions S to which can agent a belongs to.
An SVG W itself can be represented by a weighted voting game (WVG) W = (q, w), with w denoting the vector of weights (seats) of each agent a, i.e., w a ∈ w = (w 1 , .., w n ), and q being the majority quota such that 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. S ∈ W if i∈S w i > q, where W is called the set of winning coalitions, and S ∈ L if i∈S w i ≤ q, where L is called the set of losing coalitions.
In an WVG W power is ascribed to an agent a, PA a (S ∈ W), if a has a swing, i.e., if given the coalition memberships of all other agents, a by changing its originally membership in coalition S ∈ W to the complementary coalition N − S has the ability to alter the status quo of a coalition from a winning to a losing coalition, i.e., altering the collective outcome from {acceptance} to {rejection} against some resistance of others. This resistance comes from the members of S − {a}, whose view on the proposal is now no longer in line with the view of i being now a member of N − S + {a}. 12 Hence:
Summing up the power ascription for agent a over all winning coalitions containing agent a, we obtain a's power score, η a (W):
Assuming -in line with the principle of insufficient reason -that all coalitions S are equally likely, we divide the power score of an agent by 2 n−1 , i.e., number of coalitions a is a member of and, hence, could have a swing, we obtain a's Penrose-Banzhaf Power Measure (Dubey and Shapley 1979) , β a (W): 13
This formula will be applied in order to calculate the Penrose-Banzhaf measure of each confession taking into consideration the three distributions of seats considered throughout the paper as well as the Penrose-Banzhaf measure of each political party without bloc formation. 14 Example 1 Let W = [2; 2, 1, 1] be an WVG with assembly N = {a, b, c}. Hence, W = {ab, ac, abc} and L = {∅, a, b, c, bc}. Here a has a swing in the coalitions {a, b}, {a, c}, and {a, b, c}, therefore: η a (W) = 3. Correspondingly, b has a swing in {a, b} and c in {a, c}, resulting in η b (W) = η c (W) = 1. Dividing the individual power scores of the agents by 2 3−1 = 4 we obtain the Penrose-Banhaf power measure β (W) = (0.75, 0.25, 0.25) 12 For further details see van den Brink and Steffen (2008) referring to Harré and Madden (1975) and Morriss (2002) .
13 Also called the absolute Banzhaf index or absolute Banzhaf-Coleman index. See Felsenthal and Machover (1998) for a discussion about the designation of the measure.
14 The Penrose-Banzhaf measures reported in this paper have been computed using the program ipgenf, which is available at http://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae/ipgenf.html.
To calculate the distribution of power under bloc formation we need to extend our framework. With some minor adjustments we adopt in this paper the same notations and terminology of Machover (1998, 2002a) . Henceforth, the notation W | & S denotes the SVG that results from W when the members of a given coalition S choose to form a voting bloc in order to coordinate their voting behavior. In other words, all members of S agree to vote always in the same way.
As a consequence, this gives rise to a new SVG and if W is an WVG, then so is W | & S . In this new setting, the weight of & S is equal to the sum of the weights that the members of S has in the game W, while the weights of all other members in N − S as well as the required quota are kept unchanged as in W. In addition, the assembly of W | & S is given by (N − S) ∪ {& S }, which means that all the members of S are removed from N and henceforth a new agent & S (i.e., the bloc of S) is added. Naturally, the winning coalitions of W | & S are all those X ⊆ N − S such that X is a winning coalition of W and additionally all coalitions X ∪ {& S } for which X ∪ S is a winning coalition in W.
In order to correctly analyze the problem of voluntary bloc formation appropriately, the internal decision rule fixed by the bloc in order to decide about any proposal inside the bloc has to be considered. Following Machover (1998, 2002a) , we postulate that when a bloc & S is formed, the members also fix a particular internal SVG henceforth denoted W S whose assembly is S. Machover (1998, 2002a) use the term alliance for the structure of a bloc & S together with an internal SVG. The aim of the internal SVG of this alliance is to decide, for each proposal, how the bloc & S (or its delegate) will vote in the game W | & S . When the members of S form a bloc whose internal SVG is W S , this leads to a new composite SVG, which we shall denote by W W S .
This new SVG works as follows: when a proposal is suggested, the members of S having formed the bloc & S decide to vote for or against it using W S , the internal SVG of their alliance. Then, when the proposal is brought before the assembly of W, all the members of S vote as a bloc, in accordance with their internal decision. Said differently, the final outcome is the same as it would have been in W | & S with the bloc & S voting according to the internal decision. The assembly of W W S is N , the same as that of W. The winning coalitions of W W S are all sets of the form X ∪ Y , with X ⊆ S and Y ⊆ N − S, satisfying at least one of the following two conditions: (i) Y is a winning coalition of W; (ii) X is a winning coalition of W S and S ∪ Y is a winning coalition of W.
Similarly to (3), we can define the Penrose-Banzhaf measure β a [W | & S ] of any agent a in the new game W | & S when the bloc & S arises. Moreover, it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that the Penrose-Banzhaf measure in W W S are the same as in W | & S . This is not generally true. Indeed, each member of S now has direct power in the SVG W S , but as well as indirect power in W W S , which s/he exercises via the bloc &S. Following Felsenthal and Machover (2002a) , to obtain the indirect Penrose-Banzhaf measure of an agent a in the whole game W W S , one has to multiply the direct Penrose-Banzhaf measure of the agent a in W S by the Penrose-Banzhaf measure of the bloc & S in W | & S . Formally, this result is stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (Felsenthal and Machover, 2002a) . For every agent a ∈ S
By doing so, we can henceforth compare the voting power of each agent when the nature of the voting body changes as a result of the formation of voting blocs. Clearly, the bloc & S will be advantageous to all the members of S if after forming & S every one of them will be able to exercise more influence over the outcome than s/he was able to exercise originally in W. In other words, when the members of S consider forming a bloc, they are well advised to compare their prospective indirect powers in (4) with the direct powers they have in (3) in the original SVG W. Following Felsenthal and Machover (2002a) , we shall therefore say that an alliance with an internal SVG W S is expedient (or feasible) if
for all a ∈ S.
Moreover, a bloc is said to be expedient if there exists some internal SVG such that the resulting alliance is expedient, respectively. We shall summarize these notions in the following example, which is from Machover (1998, 2002a) who made a particularly interesting observations about possible scenarios of expedient alliances. 15 For more details and examples, the reader is referred to the original papers. 
Results
In this section we analyze the confessional and party related power from both decision rules applied in the Lebanese Parliament and put our results in the context to the past, current, and future political developments of the Lebanese political system.
Confessional Power in the Lebanese Parliament
We commence our analysis applying the Penrose-Banzhaf measure in order to analyze the confessional distribution of power in the Lebanese Parliament for the three alternative seat distributions, i.e., prior to the Taif agreement, the Present (under the Taif agreement), and the one under the OP. Our results for the simple majority rule are displayed in Table 2 and for the 2/3-majority rule in Table 3 .
Comparing and contrasting the situation of Christians and Muslims under each of the three seat distributions, our calculations demonstrate that under the Pre-Taif situation Christians are more powerful than Muslims. This result is in line with the seat ratio under the Pre-Taif distribution of seats which is 6:5 in favor of Christians. In this context one has to remember that the basic idea behind the confessional nature of the Lebanese electoral law was that the impact of confessions in parliament should reflect (at least roughly) their share in the population and that the dominant role of Christians in the Lebanese governance structure is regarded to have played a prominent role in the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in 1975.
When it came to the Taif Agreement in 1989 the demographic situation in Lebanon was characterized by the fact that the share of Muslims in the population was larger than the share of Christians. However, in the Taif Agreement the Christians representatives did not agree to a swap of the ratio in favor of Muslims, but only agreed to an equal split of seats for both religious groups in parliament. However, our analysis reveals that in terms of power, i.e., regarding the ability of a confession in parliament to affect the outcome of the parliamentary decision-making, the picture looks different. Muslims have partially achieved their desired swap in terms of impact. Under the simple majority rule, i.e., for ordinary legislation and the second and next rounds of the presidential elections, the Muslims became more powerful than the Christians, while under the 2/3-majority rule, i.e., for constitutional changes and for the first round of the presidential elections, Christians lost power, even the revised composition of the parliament did not change the relative power relation between Christians and Muslims: Christians remained still to be more powerful.
The current ongoing discussion about the electoral reform is still characterized by the aim of the Muslims to abolish the perceived equal split of impact on the parliamentary decision-making by Christians and Muslims and to strengthen their position in line with their larger share in the population. The Christians, instead, still try to defend the current apparently equal split. As mentioned above, the OP which sticks to equal distribution of seats between Christians and Muslims, is one of the most important and promising proposals to reach an agreement between all confessions. While the ratio between both major religious groups remains unchanged, the OP foresees an increase in the number of seats for certain sectarian subgroups. While the three largest Muslims sectarian subgroups should gain one seat each, the number of seats for the three largest Christian sectarian subgroups should remain constant. Instead three seats should be allocated to other Christian sectarian (minority) groups. This increase in terms of seats strengthens the relative position of the three larger Muslim sectarian subgroups while weakens the relative position of the three largest Christian sectarian subgroups.
Our calculations demonstrate that, if the OP would be implemented, in terms of power the strengthening of the larger Muslim sectarian subgroups and weakening the larger Christian sectarian subgroups is achieved, while still leaving the equal split of seats between between Christians and Muslims constant. However, moreover our results show that both, Christians and Muslims, as a group would also benefit form the OP in terms of power, but that the benefit for Muslims would overall be significantly larger than for the Christians. In detail: under both majority rules, all three largest Christian sectarian subgroups lose power. Moreover, also all other Christian sectarian subgroups suffer from the same effect with two exceptions: the other Christian sectarian (minority) groups who received three additional seats gain power under both majority rules and also the Armenian Orthodox gain power under the 2/3-majority rule. Concerning the Muslims, we find that the three largest Muslim sectarian subgroups are empowered, while the fourth Muslim sectarian subgroup represented in parliament, the Alawites, suffers from this change in the composition of the parliament: they lose power under both majority rules.
Over all it can be stated that, moving from the Pre-Taif to the Present distribution of seats, the total power of Christians decreases and slightly increases again from Present to the OP without reaching its initial level. Concerning the Muslims, we find that the total power for Muslims increases from Pre-Taif to Present, but also from Present to the OP. 16 Aside from these power implications closely linked to the political situation and debates in Lebanon, applying Pearson's correlation coefficient r by comparing Table 1 with tables 2 and 3, our results in tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that the tacit assumption of a very strong positive linear correlation between the share of seats of each sectarian subgroup and their power under the simple and 2/3-majority rule holds for the Lebanese Parliament (r ≥ 0.9880). In other words, the difference between the share of seats and the relative share of the Penrose-Banzhaf power is negligible under both rules. However, a closer look at the tables 4 and 5 reveal that this strong overall correlation conceals that fact that for the Present and the OP distributions of seats we can observe some a significant difference between Christians and Muslims. Under the simple majority rule Table 4 shows that Muslims under the Present seat distribution have 2.34 and under the OP 2.92 %-points more power while the Christians have correspondingly less power compared to their share of seats. Hence, we have an power advantage for the Muslims. Under the 2/3-majority rule we can find a reversal of this observation. Table 5 illustrates that Christians under the Present seat distribution have 2.03 and under the OP 2.09 %-points more power while the Muslims have correspondingly less power compared to their share of seats.
Furthermore, our analysis reveals some paradoxical power effects by moving from one seat distribution to another. Moving from the Pre-Taif to Present distribution of seats the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Greeks, Sunni, Shia and Druze gained additional seats in the parliament. Moreover, the Alawite entered the parliament as a new sectarian subgroup, or in other words: their number of seats increased from zero to a positive number. Even the number of seats for the three remaining sectarian subgroups, the Armenian Catholics, the Protestants and the other minor Christian groups remained constant, their power under both majority rules increased. At the same time the power of the Maronite, Greek Orthodox decreased under both majority rules as well as the power of the Armenian Orthodox under the 2/3-majority rule. This observed phenomenon is an instance of the well-known 'Paradox of Redistribution' (Dreyer and Schotter, 1980; Fischer and Schotter, 1978; Schotter, 1981) . 17 
Party Power in the Present Lebanese Parliament Without Bloc Formation
As mentioned in Section 1, the last parliamentary elections were held in 2009. The parliament term is supposed to be four years but it extended its own term several times until June 2017. The extension was prompted by the failure of the politicians to agree on a new electoral law. Lebanon has a large number of active political parties, which include aspects of confession-based cadre and mass-based parties. However, it is important to note that nearly all large parties belong primarily to single-sect constituencies. (Ekmekji, 2012) . The March 14 (M14) bloc, being named after the date of the Cedar Revolution, is a diverse alliance of groups seeking to assert Lebanese sovereignty as independent from Syria and militating for democratic reforms. The M14 bloc includes the (Sunni) Future Movement, the (Druze) Progressive Socialist Party, the (Christian) Lebanese Forces and Kataeb, as well as other small parties and numerous independents. The March 8 (M8) bloc, is named after the date of the demonstration thanking Syria for helping stop the Lebanese Civil War, and is a predominantly Shia pro-Syrian/Iranian movement. The M8 bloc consists primarily of the (Christian) Free Patriotic Movement along with the two main Shia parties, the Amal Movement and Hizbollah, in addition to a few smaller parties and one independent member. Table 6 provides the members of each bloc as well as the non-bloc members and their number of seats after the 2009 election. As it is clear from this table, 125 out of the 128 members of parliament either belong to the M8 and M14 blocs. The allies of the M14 bloc took 68 seats in parliament, while the M8 bloc won 57 seats and 3 seats were assigned to non-bloc members. Table 6 also gives the Penrose-Banzhaf power of each political party and each independent member without taking into consideration the bloc formation. The main fact that can be deduced from this table is that the tacit assumption of a very strong positive linear correlation between the share of seats of each party (or independent member) and their power under the simple and 2/3-majority rule nearly holds in this case (r simple majority = 0.9959, r 2/3−majority = 0.9996). In other words, the difference between the share of seats and the relative share of the Penrose-Banzhaf power is negligible under both rules. Moreover, we can observe, that out of the 21 parties and 8 independent members of parliament holding between 1 and 26 seats in parliament the 5 parties with 11 or more seats owing together 63 % of the seats in parliament, own 65 % of the total power in parliament under the simple majority rule and 63 % under the 2/3-majority rule. Finally, notice that Table 6 will be particularly important to compare the power changes of each party after bloc formation, which is addressed in the next sub-section. 18 In February 2005, the former Sunni Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was assassinated in central Beirut. The United Nations established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon for pursuing the investigation, and the prosecutor named members of Hezbollah in connection with the bombing attack. Recall that Hizbollah (Party of God in Arabic) is a major political party in Lebanon that represents the Shia Muslims. Its organization is based on both political and military elements and its armed branch, which is supported by both Syria and Iran, is considered as the most powerful militant organization in Lebanon. Soon after the prime minister's death, the United Nations investigators task was to find links between Syria's government and Hariri's assassination. During the following month, an estimated one million Lebanese protested in Beirut against the Syria's military presence in Lebanon. Called the Cedar Revolution, the protests had been combined with pressure from the international community and ended three decades of military domination of Lebanon by Syria. 
Party Power in the Present Lebanese Parliament With Bloc Formation
Taking into account the blocs our results show that under simple majority rule, M14 is all powerful, while under the 2/3-majority rule, power is split equally between both blocs (see Table 7 ). Comparing these results with the total power of the bloc members without bloc formation (see Table 8 ) it appears that in absolute terms the power of the M8 and M14 members declined for both blocs and under both majority rules applied in parliament, i.e., that we face instances of the Paradox of (Large) Size (Brams, 1975) . This paradox demonstrates that after bloc formation the total power of the bloc members can diminish after bloc formation, or, in other words, that the 'conventional wisdom that the whole is greater than -or at least equal to -the sum of its parts, is clearly violated.' (Brams, 1975 , page 178). As pointed out by Machover (1998, 2002a) and explained in Section 3, the above analysis is inappropriate as it neglects internal power effects resulting out of the decision rule applied inside each bloc. Instead our analysis has to apply the approach introduced in Section 3 which takes the indirect power of bloc members into account when assessing the bloc members' power in parliament. From the underlying formula it is obvious that this approach requires the knowledge of the internal decision rule of each bloc which is not available in our case. This implies that we are not able to analyze the 'actual' power of the members of parliament under the current bloc formation. However, we are still able to analyze whether from a power point of view the current blocs can be theoretical justified, i.e., whether there exist internal decision rules which make these blocs expedient. For this purpose we assume that each bloc has agreed on its own on a decision rule which can be represented by a WVG W S in which the internal majority quota will be named q and the weights are the seats of the bloc members in parliament. 19 Based on this assumption we have simulated the power effects for the members of each bloc under alternative majority quotas q from simple majority to unanimity. Table 10 (Appendix) displays the power effects under a selection of different quotas compared to the situation without bloc formation as given by Table 6 . Overall, our analysis revealed that for each bloc no quota exists which can ensure that the bloc is expedient under both decision rules applied in parliament. However, for M14 we found that a quota of q = 44 and q = 45, both being close to a 2/3-majority quota of q = 46, ensure that M14 is expedient under the simple majority rule in parliament, i.e., for decisions on the ordinary legislation and the second and next rounds of the presidential election, where the latter results overall in a higher total amount power for the bloc, i.e., it is the optimal quota; q * = 45. Furthermore, under the 2/3-majority rule in parliament, i.e., for decision on constitutional changes and for the first round of the presidential election, this quota is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the loss in power due to the bloc formation.
Regarding M8, it is obvious that no quota q exists which can ensure that M8 is expedient as total power of the bloc in parliament is 0 under the simple majority rule. However, the questions remain if there exists at least a quota q which makes M8 expedient under the 2/3-majority quota in parliament. Our simulation shows that this is not the case, but applying a simple majority rule inside the bloc, q = 29, the total gain of power from bloc formation is positive and reaches its maximum. Under this quota the three largest bloc members gain from bloc formation, while all other ten bloc members lose. Instead for quota of q = 35 the total gain of power from bloc formation is positive and maximized under the constrained that the number of bloc members losing from bloc formation should be minimized. In comparison to the simple majority rule now, eight members of the bloc gain power and only two lose power, but these are the members with the second and third largest number of seats in parliament. Now, one could argue that because of the fact that usually in parliament the simple majority rule could be regarded to be more relevant as this is the one applied for ordinary legislation. Then it could be inferred, that the fact that M14 is non expedient under the 2/3-majority quota in parliament is negligible, implying that the existence of M14 is theoretical justifiable on the basis of its power effects. However, this does not hold for M8, i.e., M8 in this respect is an infeasible bloc under both majority quotas in parliament, i.e., there does not exist any quota under which its members under bloc formation have at least the same power as without bloc formation. Thus, from a power point of view, M8 should be dissolved.
Taking this into account, we have investigated the effect of the dissolution of M8 on the power of M14. On the bloc level, Table 9 displays the effect of the dissolution of M8 on the power of M14 and the resulting distribution of power for the former M8 members and the members of parliament who were never belonging to a bloc. Under the simple majority rule in parliament there is no change as M14 remains to be all powerful. Under the 2/3-majority rule, total power in parliament increases and M14 gains power in absolute and relative terms. Moreover, also the former members of M8 gain power in absolute terms compared to being organized in the M8 bloc, but lose in terms of relative power. The results of the dissolution of M8 on the party level for the M14 members are displayed in Table 11 (Appendix). Investigating the power effect on each member of M14 it turns out that under any internal majority quota for this bloc its members lose power compared to the existence of M8. Hence, even M14 as a bloc gains power in parliament their members suffer from the dissolution of M8 regarding the decision-making in parliament under the 2/3-majority quota. M14 remains inexpiedient under this quota. The quota q = 45 which was originally the quota maximizing the total gain of M14 under the 2/3-majority quota in parliament is now only optimal in that sense that it minimizes the total loss of the M14 members in this case. While before the two largest members of M14 were gaining from bloc formation even in this situation they are now also suffering from it as all other members did before under the presence of M8.
Confessional Power in the Lebanese Parliament Under Bloc Formation on the Party Level
Having previously investigated the stability of bloc formation on the party level, in this section we draw our attention on the power implications of the bloc formation on the confessional level. We analyze the power effects under different internal majority quotas on the party level for both blocs, i.e., simple, 2/3-, and 3/4-majority as well as the previously identified 'optimal' quotas. The effect on the confessional power under the existence of M8 and M14 compared to the confessional power without bloc formation, as given by Table  2 and Table 3 , is displayed by Table 12 (Appendix). The following observations can be made: applying the 'optimal' quotas on the party level in both blocs, the Muslims slightly gain from the bloc formation (+ 0.0312) under the 2/3-majority rule in parliament, while under the simple majority rule in parliament they suffer from the strongest negative effect observed under all scenarios (-0.6152). Instead the Christians suffer more or less equally under both majority rules (-0.1465 under simple and -0.1489 under 2/3-majority). The results are somehow similar or even worse for the other scenarios. With one exception, both religious groups suffer from bloc formation. The only exception is the case where the simple majority rule is applied as the internal majority quota in both blocs. In this case the Christians slightly benefit under simple majority in parliament (+ 0.0283). Thus, overall, also for the two religious groups, the existence of the two blocs is not advantageous. Shifting our focus to the sectarian level, it is worthwhile to notice that in most cases under simple majority, in particular, the smaller sectarian subgroups gain from the bloc formation, while the effect on the two largest sectarian subgroups for both blocs varies. As our results in Section 4.3 have shown that M8 is inexpedient, Table 13 (Appendix) displays the results after the dissolution of M8 on the confessional level and Table 14 (Appendix) displays the power effects compared to the existing situation with M8 as given by Table 12. Given that after the dissolution of M8 the M14 bloc is still all powerful under the simple majority rule in parliament, there is also no effect on the confessional level. However, under the 2/3-majority rule in parliament effects can be identified in the case of simple majority or the 'optimal' quotas were applied as internal bloc quotas on the party level inside the blocs. In both cases, the Muslims suffer from the dissolution of M8 while the Christians gain from it. In particular, on the sectarian level, all Muslim sectarian subgroups suffer from it with one exception: there is no effect on Alawites being the smallest sectarian subgroup among the Muslims. Instead under the Christian sectarian subgroups the Maronites being the largest and most powerful sectarian subgroup in parliament without bloc formation gains from the dissolution of M8. Instead the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics, being the second and third largest and powerful Christian sectarian subgroups in parliament without bloc formation, suffer from the disappearance of M8.
Thus, while before with the existence of M8 they gain power from bloc formation, they are now worse off than without bloc formation sharing the fate of the other smaller Christian sectarian groups under bloc formation if the 2/3-majority rule is applied in parliament.
Concluding remarks
In the current paper we studied the confessional and party related distribution of power in the Lebanese Parliament. We began with the Pre-Taif composition of the parliament characterized by a 6:5 ratio in favor of the Christians. For this composition we obtained the expected result that the Christians are more powerful than the Muslims, even we found an instance of the Paradox of Redistribution on the sectarian subgroup level. In the face of the demographic changes in Lebanon which led to Muslim majority in the population, under the Taif Agreement Christians accepted an equal split of the parliamentary seats between Christian and Muslims. However, our results demonstrate that under the simple majority rule in parliament this resulted in a reversal of the power relations, i.e., the Muslims became more powerful than the Christians. Regarding the 2/3-majority rule the Christians remained to be more powerful than the Muslims, but faced a significant loss of power while Muslims significantly gained power. Afterwards we addressed the ongoing discussion about an electoral reform, which is still characterized by the aim of the Muslims to abolish the perceived equal split of impact between Christians and Muslims on parliamentary decisionmaking. We focussed on the analysis of the OP which sticks to equal distribution of seats between Christians and Muslims, but aims to strengthen the relative position of the larger Muslim sectarian subgroups while weakening the relative position of the major Christian Christian subgroups. We demonstrated that in terms of power implementation of the OP would achieve this aim. Moreover, we showed that both. Muslims and Christians, as a group would gain power under the OP, while the benefit for the Muslims would overall be significantly larger than for the Christians. We found that, overall, moving from the PreTaif to the Present distribution of seats the total power of Christians decreases and slightly increases again from Present to the OP without reaching its initial level. Concerning the Muslims, we found that the total power for Muslims increases from Pre-Taif to Present, but also from Present to the OP In the subsequent part of the paper we put our attention on the power of the parties in present parliament. The political situation of the parties in the parliament is characterized by the existence of two large blocs. We showed that in terms of power it is infeasible for both blocs to be overall expedient, i.e., that there do not exist any internal decision rules for both blocs such that all members of both blocs benefit from their bloc membership under both decision rules applied in parliament. However, we were able to identify 'optimal' internal majority quotas for both blocs and both majority rules in parliament. In case of M14 were even obtained a quota which makes the bloc ceteris paribus expedient in terms of the commonly more important simple majority rule in parliament. However, in case of the 2/3-majority rule in parliament and in case of M8 we were only able to identify internal quotas which reduce the total loss of power of the bloc to a minimum. Taking into account this insight we investigated the effect of a dissolution of M8 on M14. Assuming that no new alternative bloc would be formed, we found that now, also under the simple majority-rule in parliament, no internal majority quota for M14 exists which could make the bloc at least expedient under this rule. However, we obtained that the former optimal internal majority quota remains to be optimal in the sense that it minimizes the total loss of power of the bloc. Finally, we studied the effect of the bloc formation on the confessional power in the parliament. We demonstrated that also for the Christians and Muslims the existence of the two blocs is not advantageous.
Our results on the stability of the bloc formation are somehow in line and might even explain the current situation of the blocs in Lebanon. Even they are, currently, officially still existing, their practical impact and functioning is limited. However, there exist some conjectures why M8 may be still existent. From a confessional perspective we already pointed out earlier that the Muslims suffer over all from the dissolution of M8, while Christians gain from it. Hence, Muslims, forming also the majority in the population, might have no incentive to dissolve M8. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to notice that in the Lebanese government, which consists of 30 ministers, M8 is represented with 17 ministers while only 13 are affiliated with M14. This reverses the distribution of power among both blocs in government compared to the situation in the parliament: while in parliament M14 is all powerful under the simple majority rule, for the government this is M8. Thus, in some sense the status quo ensures a kind of balance of power between both blocs. 20 Table 10 
